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Abstract. In inﬁnite horizon incomplete market economies, Ponzi schemes are avoided and equi-
librium exists when collateral repossession is the only mechanism enforcing borrowers not to en-
tirely default on their promises.
In these economies, we add default enforcement mechanisms that are eﬀective, i.e. induce
payments besides the value of collateral guarantees. We prove that, independently of prices, the
individual’s problem does not have a physically feasible solution when collateral guarantees are not
large enough relative to the eﬀectiveness of the additional enforcement mechanisms. We also show
that this result does not depend on speciﬁc types of such mechanisms, as long as they are eﬀective.
Keywords. Eﬀective default enforcements, Collateral repossession, Individual’s optimality.
JEL classiﬁcation: D50; D52.
1. Introduction
In modern ﬁnancial markets, collateral guarantees play an important role in enforcing borrowers
not to entirely default on their ﬁnancial promises. These guarantees are used in several credit
operations, from corporate bonds to Collateralized Mortgages Obligations,
1 allowing markets to
reduce credit risk and increase portfolio diversiﬁcation. However, to protect investors from the
excess of losses induced by large negative shocks in the value of collateral guarantees, ﬁnancial
markets may create and implement additional enforcement mechanisms against default. In this
paper, we focus on the theoretical eﬀects of this policy.
In general equilibrium models, the collateralization of ﬁnancial contracts is mostly addressed
when the only default enforcement mechanism is the seizure of the associated collateral guarantees.
2
In inﬁnite horizon models with incomplete markets, and without exogenous debt constraints or
transversality conditions, Araujo, P´ ascoa and Torres-Mart´ ınez (2002) proved the existence of equi-
librium independently of the choice of physical collateral guarantees. Essentially, when collateral
repossession is the only default enforcement mechanism, non-arbitrage conditions ensure that the
price of the joint operation of taking a loan and constituting the respective collateral requirements
is always non-negative, eliminating Ponzi schemes. In such a context, as the existence of collateral
Date: August 14, 2007 (revised version).
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1That is, derivative assets secured by pools of individual mortgages, each of which is backed mostly by real estates.
2For a seminal two-period general equilibrium model of collateralized loans, see Geanakoplos and Zame (1992),
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requirements rationalize tight debt constraints, computational methods can be used to approximate
equilibrium allocations for any choice of collateral bundles (see Kubler and Schmedders (2003)).
In the economy studied by Araujo, P´ ascoa and Torres-Mart´ ınez (2002), we add default enforce-
ment mechanisms that are eﬀective, i.e. enforce payments besides the value of the collateral guar-
antees. In this context, if these additional enforcement mechanisms are persistently eﬀective, we
prove our main result: independent of prices, the individual’s problem does not have a physically
feasible solution when collateral requirements are not large enough relative to the eﬀectiveness of
such mechanisms. Regarding the size of these requirements and in order to ensure our result, we
provide upper bounds in terms of the primitives of the economy. Additionally, we only need these
additional mechanisms to become persistently eﬀective in at least one path of uncertainty, even if
the probability of such event is asymptotically zero.
Also, we summarize additional default enforcement mechanisms by their eﬀectiveness on enforcing
additional payments. Thus, we can include several types of mechanisms in our analysis, provided
that their eﬀectiveness is equivalent to either the seizure of a percentage of the remanning debt
or the imposition of a pecuniary default penalty. With this approach, we can focus on the causes
generating the non-existence of a solution for the individual’s problem. In fact, our result does
not depend on speciﬁc types of additional enforcement mechanisms, but only on whether these
mechanisms are eﬀective or not.
Previously, P´ ascoa and Seghir (2006) have shown that the individual’s problem may not have
a physically feasible solution when the only enforcement mechanism besides collateral repossession
is given by linear utility penalties for default. They provide examples of economies in which those
penalties are harsh, implying in loan values greater than that of the associated collateral require-
ments, which, then, lead to the non-existence of an optimal plan compatible with the available
physical resources.
3 However, if follows from our main result that the non-existence of a physically
feasible solution for the individual’s problem does not depend on speciﬁc types of additional en-
forcement mechanisms. Also, as we show, it is not necessary to ensure that borrowers honor a high
percentage of the original promises, it is suﬃcient to have collateral requirements that are not large
enough in a context of persistently eﬀective additional enforcement mechanisms.
In inﬁnite horizon economies with collateral repossession here studied, the mere presence of
additional eﬀective enforcement mechanisms does not eliminate the existence of equilibria. In fact,
if non-arbitrage conditions ensure that the diﬀerence between the value of the collateral requirements
and that of the associated loan is always non-negative, then, arguments analogous to those made by
Araujo, P´ ascoa and Torres-Mart´ ınez (2002) imply equilibrium existence. However, in such a context,
we claim that the choice of collateral guarantees becomes relevant to ensure the non-negativity of
the diﬀerence above.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 presents an inﬁnite horizon economy
with assets subject to default, where, in addition to collateral repossession, other eﬀective default
3Since the additional enforcement mechanism that these authors study may become eﬀective only when these
penalties are harsh, they impose upper bounds on utility penalties to ensure the existence of equilibrium (see Theorem
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enforcement mechanisms exist. In Section 3 we show our main result. Finally, we discuss exten-
sions of our results and its implications to ﬁnite horizon models, even when agents have bounded
rationality.
2. Model
Consider a discrete time, inﬁnite horizon economy with uncertainty and symmetric information.
Let S be the set of states of nature and Ft the information available at period t ∈ T := N ∪ {0}.
Ft is a partition of S, and if t0 > t, make Ft0 ﬁner than Ft. Summarizing the uncertainty structure,
deﬁne an event-tree as D = {(t,σ) ∈ T ×2S : t ∈ T,σ ∈ Ft}, where a pair ξ := (t,σ) ∈ D is called a
node and t(ξ) := t is the associated period of time. For simplicity, at t = 0 there is no information,
F0 := S, and there is only one node, ξ0.
A node ξ0 = (t0,ψ0) is a successor of ξ = (t,ψ), denoted by ξ0 ≥ ξ, if t0 ≥ t and ψ0 ⊆ ψ. given
ξ ∈ D, the set of its successors is given by the subtree D(ξ) := {µ ∈ D : µ ≥ ξ}. Also, for
each ξ 6= ξ0, since Ft(ξ) is ﬁner than Ft(ξ)−1, there is only one predecessor ξ−. We deﬁne ξ0 as an
immediate successor of ξ when it is in the set ξ+ := {ξ0 ∈ D : ξ0 ≥ ξ,t(ξ0) = t(ξ) + 1}.
Given k ∈ N ∪ {+∞}, we call path of uncertainty any set of nodes (µn;n ∈ N, n ≤ k) ⊂ D in
which every µn+1 is an immediate successor of µn, for each n < k. A set B ⊂ D does not have ﬁnite
paths when for any k ∈ N and for each path of uncertainty (µn;n ∈ N,n ≤ k) ⊂ B, there exists
η ∈ B such that η ∈ µ
+
k .
At each node ξ in the event-tree D there is a non-empty and ﬁnite set of commodities, L. These
commodities may be traded in a competitive market at unitary prices pξ = (p(ξ,l))l∈L ∈ RL
+ by a
non-empty set of consumers and, at the same time, may depreciate from a node to its successors.
Along the event-tree, this depreciation follows a technology represented by a family of matrices with
non-negative entries, (Yξ)ξ∈D, where Yξ := ((Yξ)l,l0)(l,l0)∈L×L. For each (l,l0) ∈ L × L, (Yξ)l,l0 is
the amount of commodity l obtained at ξ if one unit of commodity l0 is consumed at ξ−. Also, let
Wξ ∈ RL
+ be the aggregate physical resources up to node ξ, while W = (Wξ)ξ∈D is the plan of such
resources.
There is a ﬁnite set of real assets J(ξ) at each node ξ ∈ D. Each j ∈ J(ξ) is short-lived, has
promises A(µ,j) ∈ RL
++ ∪ {0} at µ ∈ ξ+, and is traded in competitive markets by a unitary price
q(ξ,j) ∈ R+. Note that, the non-triviality of ﬁnancial promises implies that its market value take into
account all the commodities prices. This assumption may be intuitively understood as an indexation
for asset payments using a price index of a referential bundle that may vary with the uncertainty
of the economy. Thus, independently of prices, when at least a percentage of original promises is
honored by borrowers, lenders maintain a minimal purchase power for every commodity.
Assets are subject to credit risk, thus, in order to limit lenders’ losses, borrowers are burdened
to constitute physical collateral guarantees. For every unit of an asset j ∈ J(ξ) sold, borrowers
must establish—and may consume—a bundle C(ξ,j) ∈ RL
+ \ {0} that will be seized by the market
in case of default. For the sake of notation, let J(D) := {(ξ,j) ∈ D × ∪µ∈DJ(µ) : j ∈ J(ξ)} and
J+(D) := {(µ,j) ∈ D × ∪η∈DJ(η) : (µ−,j) ∈ J(D)}.4 Does Collateral avoid Ponzi Schemes ?
Furthermore, additional default enforcement mechanisms may exist. We let ﬁnancial markets
recover, at each (µ,j) ∈ J+(D), amounts of payments F(µ,j)(pµ) that may be higher, in case of
default, than the value of depreciated collateral guarantees. In these payments, we allow generality
in the additional enforcements by representing them through mechanisms that may seize: a ﬁxed
percentage of the remaining debt, λ(µ,j), and/or the market value of a given bundle of resources,
pµy(µ,j). These mechanisms may be intuitively interpreted as a probability that the judicial system
imposes the entire payment of the remaining debt, and a real pecuniary default penalty. More
formally, for every unit of asset j ∈ J(ξ), each borrower pays at each µ ∈ ξ+ an amount
F(µ,j)(pµ) := min{pµA(µ,j),pµYµC(ξ,j)} + λ(µ,j) [pµA(µ,j) − pµYµC(ξ,j)]+
+min{pµy(µ,j),(1 − λ(µ,j))[pµA(µ,j) − pµYµC(ξ,j)]+},
where (λ(µ,j),y(µ,j)) ∈ [0,1]×(RL
++∪{0}) is the eﬀectiveness of additional enforcement mechanisms
on asset j at node µ, and, for any z ∈ R, [z]+ := max{z,0}.
Regarding the additional enforcement mechanisms above, we do not intend to explicitly model
how the market imposes on borrowers additional payments besides the value of collateral guaran-
tees. We summarize such mechanisms by their eﬀectiveness. This approach allows us to include
in our analysis economic (i.e. those induced by legal contracts) and non-economic (e.g. moral
sanctions, loss of reputations) default enforcement mechanisms, provided that these mechanisms
may be summarized by a vector of eﬀectiveness. Most importantly, with this approach, it is possi-
ble to focus on the consequences of the eﬀectiveness of such mechanisms on the individual’s decision.
Definition. Given (µ,j) ∈ J+(D), additional enforcement mechanisms are eﬀective on asset j at
node µ when both (λ(µ,j),y(µ,j)) and A(µ,j) are non-zero vectors. Additional enforcement mecha-
nisms are persistently eﬀective in a path of uncertainty Θ, if for any µ ∈ Θ, there is j ∈ J(µ−) on
which additional enforcement mechanisms are eﬀective at µ.
For any path of uncertainty Θ := (µn;n ∈ N) in which additional enforcement mechanisms are
persistently eﬀective, deﬁne Eﬀ(Θ) ⊂ D(µ1) as the maximal connected set containing Θ and having,
at each µ ∈ Eﬀ(Θ), at least one j ∈ J(µ−) on which additional enforcement mechanisms are eﬀective
at µ.4 Note that, given (µ,j) ∈ J+(D), those deﬁnitions above not only depend on the parameters
(λ(µ,j),y(µ,j)), but also on the non-triviality of the original promises. Thus, eﬀective additional
enforcement mechanisms means that, in the case of default, a strictly positive amount of resources
is seized besides the depreciated collateral value.
In contrast to any equilibrium model, we focus in the non-existence of a physically feasible solution
for the individual’s problem and its relationship with the existence of opportunities to implement
Ponzi schemes. For these reasons, it is suﬃcient to assume that there is an inﬁnitely lived agent,
namely i, who perfectly foresees both market prices and the eﬀectiveness of additional enforcement
mechanisms.
4A set B ⊂ D is connected when, for each pair (ξ,µ) ∈ B × B, such that µ ≥ ξ, the (only) path of uncertainty
connecting ξ to µ is contained in B. Given ξ ∈ D, a set B ⊂ D(ξ) is maximal relative to a property (A) when there
is no other subset of D(ξ) containing itself and satisfying (A).Thiago Revil and Juan Pablo Torres-Mart´ ınez 5
Agent i has physical endowments (wi
ξ)ξ∈D ∈ R
D×L
+ and preferences represented by a utility
function Ui : R
D×L
+ → R+∪{+∞}. As commodities may be durable, we denote by Wi
ξ the cumulated
endowments of agent i up to node ξ (including wi
ξ). Let xξ ∈ RL
+ be a bundle of autonomous
consumption at node ξ (i.e. non-collateralized commodities). Also, let θ(ξ,j) and ϕ(ξ,j) be quantities




+ , a plan
(x,θ,ϕ) :=
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(xξ,θ(ξ,j),ϕ(ξ,j));ξ ∈ D, j ∈ J(ξ)
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pξYξC(ξ−,j)ϕ(ξ−,j) + F(ξ,j)(pξ)(θ(ξ−,j) − ϕ(ξ−,j))

, ∀ξ > ξ0.
Also, (x,θ,ϕ) ∈ E is physically feasible if xξ +
P
j∈J(ξ) C(ξ,j)ϕ(ξ,j) ≤ Wξ, for any ξ ∈ D. Finally,




(ξ,j))ξ∈D), choosing a budget feasible plan (xi,θi,ϕi) ∈ E.
3. Enforcement mechanisms and the size of collateral bundles
In this section, we prove our main result: in contrast to the polar case studied by Araujo, P´ ascoa
and Torres-Mart´ ınez (2002), the market choice of collateral bundles becomes relevant when there are
persistently eﬀective additional enforcement mechanisms besides collateral repossession. To achieve
our objective, we impose the following hypotheses.
Assumption A1. For any ξ ∈ D, Wi
ξ  0.
Assumption A2. Given z = (zξ) ∈ R
L×D
+ , deﬁne Ui(z) =
P
ξ∈D ui
ξ(zξ), where for any ξ ∈ D, the
function ui
ξ : RL
+ → R+ is concave, continuous and strictly increasing. Also, Ui(W) is ﬁnite.5
Given η ∈ D, let Ω(η) be the set of assets j ∈ J(η) on which additional enforcement mech-
anisms are eﬀective at some node µ ∈ η+. Note that, given a path of uncertainty Θ, in which
additional enforcement mechanisms are persistently eﬀective, if Eﬀ(Θ) does not have ﬁnite paths,
then Ω(η) 6= ∅, ∀η ∈ Eﬀ(Θ).
5Note that, as utilities are ﬁnite when evaluated in aggregate physical resources, the non-negativity of functions
uh
ξ(·) implies that, in any physical feasible allocation, agent’s i utility is ﬁnite. Also, the concavity of the functions
(ui
ξ)ξ∈D implies that Ui is concave. Thus, for any σ > 1, Ui(σW) is also ﬁnite. In fact, Ui(0.5W) < +∞ and,
therefore, by concavity, Ui(W) ≥ τUi(0.5W) + (1 − τ)Ui(σW), where τ = 2σ−2
2σ−1 ∈ (0,1), which implies that
Ui(σW) < +∞.6 Does Collateral avoid Ponzi Schemes ?
Theorem. Under Assumptions A1-A2, suppose that additional enforcement mechanisms are persis-
tently eﬀective in a path of uncertainty Θ and that Eﬀ(Θ) does not have ﬁnite paths. Independently
of the prices (p,q) ∈ Π, there are strictly positive upper bounds, (Ψη)η∈Eﬀ(Θ), such that if
min
j∈Ω(η)
kC(η,j)kΣ < Ψη, ∀ η ∈ Eﬀ(Θ),
then agent i’s problem does not have a physically feasible solution.
Proof. To shorten the notation, given z = (z1,...,zm) ∈ Rm
+, let kzkΣ :=
Pm
s=1 zs and kzkmax :=




















A(µ,j,l) + πµ min
l∈L




is strictly positive, where A(µ,j,l) (resp. y(µ,j,l)) denotes the l-th coordinate of A(µ,j) (resp. y(µ,j)).
Thus, suppose that, at each η ∈ Eﬀ(Θ), minj∈Ω(η) kC(η,j)kΣ < Ψη :=
Υη
πη .
Assume that, for some (p,q) ∈ Π, there is an optimal budget and physically-feasible solu-
tion (xi,θi,ϕi) ∈ E for agent i’s problem. It follows from Lemma 2 (see Appendix) that there
are, for every η ∈ D, multipliers γi
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where the last inequality follows from Assumption A2 jointly with the physical feasibility of i’s con-
sumption. Moreover, it is possible to ﬁnd lower and upper bounds for γi
ηpη at each η ∈ D. Assump-
tion A1 and equation (5) ensure that γi


















ηkpηkΣ ≥ πη and, at every node η ∈ Eﬀ(Θ), since Ω(η) 6= ∅ and minj∈Ω(η) kC(η,j)kΣ <
Ψη, there exists j ∈ Ω(η) such that
γi





µF(µ,j)(pµ) < 0, (6)
6Given a concave function f : X ⊂ Rn → R ∪ {−∞}, at any x ∈ X, the super-diﬀerential of f, ∂f(x), is deﬁned
as the set of points p ∈ X, called super-gradients, such that f(y) − f(x) ≤ p(y − x), ∀y ∈ X.Thiago Revil and Juan Pablo Torres-Mart´ ınez 7
where the last inequality follows from the deﬁnition of the upper bound of collateral requirements.
Finally, using the Lemma 1 in the Appendix, we conclude that agent i’s problem does not have a
solution, contradicting the optimality of (xi,θi,ϕi) ∈ E under prices (p,q) ∈ Π. 
Note that, by construction, upper bounds on collateral requirements, (Ψη)η∈Eﬀ(Θ), depend only
on the primitives of the economy and, for computational objectives, can be easily found.
Also, given any plan of prices, when collateral requirements are not high enough in the sense of
the Theorem above, either there is no solution for individual’s problem or the associated optimal
plans are not physically feasible. In fact, there are cases in which a solution for individual’s problem
exists independently of the size of collateral bundles. More precisely, it is always possible to ﬁnd
strictly positive prices (p,q) ∈ Π such that, for any (ξ,j) ∈ J(D), pξC(ξ,j)−q(ξ,j) > 0. Therefore, at
prices (p,q), the set of budget feasible allocations is compact in the product topology and, when Ui
is continuous, there is a solution for agent i’s problem. However, when collateral guarantees satisfy
the conditions of the Theorem above, our main result ensure that this solution is not physically
feasible.
Remark (On the generality of our approach). Along our model, since debt contracts are
pooled into derivatives following a trivial passthrough structure, we identify primary (debt) with
secondary (investment) markets. Essentially, this identiﬁcation is possible because the amount of
payments besides the value of collateral guarantees (per unit of asset sold) is the same for each
borrower and does not depend on the history of default.
Suppose that, at each node and for each agent, the amounts of loans, the access to credit markets
and/or the available endowments depend on the previous payments. In turn, this new framework
may create endogenous incentives to pay amounts larger than the depreciated value of collateral
requirements. Also, suppose that the model is convex7 and that agents perfectly foresee the pay-
ments of derivatives. That is, analogous to the speciﬁcation of functions (F(µ,j))(µ,j)∈J+(D), lenders
advance the percentage of the remaining debt payed after the seizure of collateral guarantees. In
this context, we claim that our main result still holds. In fact, independently of how enforcement
mechanism induce additional payments, Lemma 1 holds. Thus, to remake our arguments we only
need that optimal allocations satisfy inequalities (3)-(5). But, given the convexity of the model and
using the same techniques of Lemma 2, these inequalities are valid.
4. About finite lived agents and bounded rationality
In collateralized ﬁnancial markets, we prove that when inﬁnite-lived agents are rational—in the
sense that they perfect foresight future prices and eﬀectiveness of default enforcement mechanisms—
any persistently eﬀective additional mechanisms jointly with not large enough collateral guarantees
imply in the non-existence of a physically feasible solution for individual’s problem.
7That is, objective functions still satisfy Assumption A2 and, given prices, the set of budget feasible allocations is
convex.8 Does Collateral avoid Ponzi Schemes ?
On the other hand, our main result may not hold for ﬁnite horizon economies. In fact, the
scarcity of collateral requirements may ensure the existence of equilibrium in these economies when
agents are rational, even with additional eﬀective enforcements. Thus, without loss of equilibrium
existence, other eﬀective default enforcements may be added to the seminal model of passtrough
securities of Geanakoplos and Zame (2002) or to the Steinert and Torres-Mart´ ınez’s (2007) model
of Collateralized Loan Obligations.
Allowing weaker requirements of rationality, Daher, Martins-da-Rocha, P´ ascoa and Vailakis
(2006) show that the collateralization of debts solves the problems associated to the existence of
temporary equilibrium in a two-period economy with default, even in the presence of utility penal-
ties. The main idea is that, independently of the support of individual beliefs about future prices
and future states of nature, borrowers hold collateral requirements and to foreclosure their debts it
is always possible to deliver only the depreciated value of these bundles. Thus, errors in forecasts of
future prices do not induce solvency problems in the economy. However, this is a particularity of the
additional enforcement mechanism given by utility penalties, as any agent may choose to internalize
the associated penalties when his resources are insuﬃcient to honor his ﬁnancial obligations. In
fact, when agents are ﬁnite-lived and take into account expectations about the future eﬀectiveness
of additional enforcement mechanisms here addressed, individual’s problem may not have a solution.
Intuitively, errors in future forecasts of the eﬀectiveness of additional enforcements still may lead to
solvency problems.
Our analysis also holds when long-lived real assets are available for trading. Essentially, non-
arbitrage conditions associated to individual’s problem are still valid (see Araujo, P´ ascoa and Torres-
Mart´ ınez (2007)). Finally, if we want collateral requirements to became endogenous, as in Geanako-
plos and Zame (2002), a pool of ﬁnancial contracts can be oﬀered at each node, with the same real
promises but with diﬀerent associated collateral bundles. Thus, the choice of ﬁnancial contracts
traded by borrowers induce an endogenous choice of the associated collateral. However, it is impor-
tant to be careful with the size of the available collateral requirements, since individual’s optimality
may become incompatible with commodity market feasibility.
Appendix
In a context of collateralized assets and linear utility penalties for default, P´ ascoa and Seghir (2006) show
that Ponzi schemes could be implemented if there exists a subtree D(ξ) such that for every node µ in it
there is always some asset j ∈ J(µ) whose price exceeds the respective collateral value, pµC(µ,j) −q(µ,j) < 0
(see Remark 3.1 in P´ ascoa and Seghir (2006)). In such event, the individual’s problem does not have a
ﬁnite solution. In our context, weaker conditions ensure the non-existence of a solution for the individual’s
problem.
Lemma 1. Assume that, given x ∈ R
L×D
+ , if U
i(x) is ﬁnite, then U
i(y) > U
i(x) for any y > x. Suppose
that additional enforcement mechanisms are persistently eﬀective in a path Θ = (µn;n ∈ N) such that, for
any η ∈ Eﬀ(Θ), there exists j ∈ J(η) for which pηC(η,j)−q(η,j) < 0. Then, agent i’s individual problem does
not have a ﬁnite solution, otherwise, Ponzi schemes could be implemented.Thiago Revil and Juan Pablo Torres-Mart´ ınez 9
Proof. Assume there is a budget feasible plan for agent i, (x
i,θ
i,ϕ
i), that gives a ﬁnite optimum. Under
the monotonicity condition stated in the Lemma, pη  0 for every node η ∈ D. For each η ∈ Eﬀ(Θ), let
J





















































pηA(η,j) δη−, ∀η ∈ Eﬀ(Θ) \ {µ1}, ∀l ∈ L,















pηA(η,j) δη−, ∀η ∈ Eﬀ(Θ) \ {µ1}. (8)
By the deﬁnition of Eﬀ(Θ), it follows that (xξ,θξ,ϕξ)ξ∈D is budget feasible at prices (p,q). Moreover,
equations above show that Ponzi schemes are possible at prices (p,q) because agent i increases his borrow-
ing at node µ1 and, depending on the realization of the uncertainty, he pays his future commitments either
by using new credit—at the nodes in which there is eﬀectiveness—or by delivering depreciated collateral
guarantees—for the nodes µ / ∈ Eﬀ(Θ) such that µ
− ∈ Eﬀ(Θ). Finally, it follows that (xξ,θξ,ϕξ)ξ∈D im-




The following result and its demonstration are analogous to Proposition 1 in Araujo, P´ ascoa and Torres-
Mart´ ınez (2007). However, as slight modiﬁcations are necessary we present the whole proof for the readers.




i) ∈ E. Under
Assumptions A1 and A2, if z
i gives a ﬁnite optimal for agent i’s problem at prices (p,q), then for every
η ∈ D, the function u
i








(η,j), there are multipliers
γ
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Proof. Given T ∈ N, deﬁne DT = {η ∈ D : t(η) = T} and D
T = {η ∈ D : η ∈
ST
k=0 Dk}. For any η ∈ D,






+ . For convenience of notations, let zξ−
0
:= 0 ∈ Z(ξ
−
0 ), where Z(ξ
−
0 ) := R
L
+.10 Does Collateral avoid Ponzi Schemes ?
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j∈J(η) C(η,j)ϕ(η,j) ≤ 2Wη, ∀ η ∈ D
T,
zη = 0, ∀η ∈ DT,
where the inequality g
i
η(zη,zη−;p,q) ≤ 0 represent the budget constraint, that is, inequality (1) or (2) of



























j∈J(η) C(η,j)ϕ(η,j) ≥ 0;
−∞ otherwise.
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For each η ∈ D and γη ∈ R+, deﬁne L
i
η(·,γ;p,q) : Z(η) × Z(η
−) → R as
L
i
η(zη,zη−,γη; p,q) = ν
i
η(zη) − γη g
i
η(zη,zη−;p,q).
Given (T,η) ∈ N × D, deﬁne the set Ξ










T(η). It follows from Rockafellar (1997, Theorem 28.3), that there exist non-negative
multipliers (γ
i,T




























η− ;p,q) = 0.














       
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zη := (xη,θη,ϕη) ∈ Z(η) ∀η ∈ DT,
gi
η(zη,zη−;p,q) ≤ 0, ∀ η ∈ DT,
xη +
P
j∈J(η) C(η,j)ϕ(η,j) ≤ 2Wη, ∀ η ∈ DT,
zη = 0, ∀η ∈ DT,
If q(η,j) = 0 then θ(η,j) = 0.
Under Assumption A2 the objective function on ( ˜ Pi,T) is continuous, and the set of admissible allocations is compact
in
Q
η∈DT Z(η). Note that, to ensure this it is necessary to have non-zero collateral requirements, otherwise, long
and short positions are unbounded.
Thus, there is a solution (z
i,T
η )η∈DT . Moreover, this solution for ( ˜ Pi,T) is also an optimal choice for (Pi,T).
Essentially, the existence of a ﬁnite optimum at prices (p,q) for the agent i’s problem ensure that, when q(η,j) = 0,
the payments F(µ,j)(pµ) must be equal zero, for each µ ∈ η+. Thus, when q(η,j) = 0, choosing positives amounts of
θ(η,j) does not induce any gains.
9Note that, otherwise, agent i improve his utility in D choosing the allocation (z
i,T
η )η∈DT in the sub-tree DT,
without making any (physical or ﬁnancial) trade after the nodes with date T.Thiago Revil and Juan Pablo Torres-Mart´ ınez 11
Claim A. For each η ∈ D, the sequence (γ
i,T
































ξ), ∀aη ∈ Ξ
T(η),
























η,0,0), ∀ η ∈ D
t−1,

























Assumptions A1 ensure that, for each η ∈ D, minl∈L W
i
(η,l) > 0. Also, Assumption A2 implies that
kpηkΣ > 0, guaranteing the ﬁrst result.
On the other hand, given (zη)η∈DT ∈ Ξ















Thus, ﬁx µ ∈ D
T−1 and aµ ∈ Ξ





η, ∀ η 6= µ,



























































η(p,q) · aµ, ∀η ∈ µ
+.
Also, budget feasibility of (z
i























































 · (aη − z
i
η).
Using (14), we conclude the proof. 
Since D is countable and, for any node η, the sequence (γ
i,T
η )T≥t(η) is bounded, using Tychonoﬀ Theorem
(see Aliprantis and Border (1999, Theorem 2.57)), there is a common subsequence (Tk)k∈N ⊂ N and non-
negative multipliers, (γ
i













η−;p,q) = 0,12 Does Collateral avoid Ponzi Schemes ?
where the last equation follows from the strictly monotonicity of u
i
η. Moreover, it follows from the Claim




































 · (aη − z
i
η), ∀ aη ∈ Ξ
t(η)+1(η). (16)
Therefore, equation (11) follows and, as the plan (z
i
























where δZ(η) : R
L × R
J(η) × R
J(η) → R ∪ {−∞} satisﬁes δZ(η)(z) = 0, when z ≥ 0 and δZ(η)(z) = −∞,


































Notice that, by deﬁnition, for each z ≥ 0,κ ∈ ∂δZ(η)(z) ⇔ 0 ≤ κ(y−z), ∀ y ≥ 0, therefore, κ
i
η ≥ 0. Thus,
the inequalities stated in the lemma hold from equation (17). On the other hand, strictly monotonicity of
function u
i
η, ensure that v
i
η  0 and, therefore, it follows from (9), that γ
i
η is strictly positive. 
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